湖南省娄底市人民政府


第25号



《娄底市行政机关内部行政行为规范（试行）》已经2008年10月24日市人民政府第10次常务会议审议通过，现予公布，自2009年1月1日起施行。







代 市 长



二○○八年十一月二十八日





娄底市行政机关内部行政行为规范（试行）



　　第一条 为提高行政机关办事效率，优化发展环境，建立高效运转机制，推进效能政府建设，根据《湖南省行政程序规定》，结合我市实际，制定本规范。

第二条 本规范所称的行政机关内部行政行为，是指全市各级行政机关（含法律、法规授权的组织和受行政机关委托具有行政管理职能的组织）之间办理请示、报告、会议纪要、询问、答复、商洽工作等内部行政事务，其规定的办结期限，适用市各级行政机关。

各级行政机关办理本市内党委机关、人大政协机关、司法机关、民主党派、群团组织、企事业组织的批示、函件、询问、商洽工作等事务的期限，办理公民、法人或其他组织向行政机关提出工作建议的信函（信访件、行政复议申请等除外）的期限，参照本规范执行。

第三条 行政许可、行政处罚、行政收费等外部行政行为，按照相关法律、法规、规章和政策执行，不适用本规范。

第四条 行政机关内部行政行为，必须严格遵守有关法律、法规、规章和其他有关规定，坚持提高效率、运转有序、公开透明、责任明晰的原则，更好地服务经济社会发展。

第五条 对于涉及抢险救灾、突发事件等紧急事项的处理，应坚持急事急办、特事特办的原则，严格按照有关规定和要求及时办理，并加强督办，以防延误。

第六条 各级人民政府负责本规范的组织实施；各级政府办公室、监察机关、政府法制部门负责本规定的监督检查指导和责任追究。

　　第七条 各行政机关对本单位处、科、股、站、所等内设机构的内部行政事务处理，由各行政机关制定具体实施细则。

第八条 市人民政府通过会议集体决定的事项或者市长、分管副市长对下级行政机关（含下级行政机关负责人）的批示、转阅件等，承办机关应按照下列规定，以书面或者口头方式向市人民政府或作出批示的市长、分管副市长报告办理落实情况：

（一）会议决定或者批示、转阅件明确了办结时限的，按照明确的时限办理；

（二）会议决定或者批示、转阅件没有明确办结时限，但相关法律、法规、规章规定了时限的，从其规定；

（三）会议决定或者批示、转阅件无明确办结时限，且法律、法规、规章无明确办结时限的，承办机关应在知悉会议决定或收到批示、转阅件之日起10个工作日内办结。

市人民政府通过会议集体决定或者市长、分管副市长明确指定或批示给2个以上行政机关办理的事项，有牵头部门的，由牵头部门按照要求办理；没有明确牵头部门的，由各相关行政机关按照其职责权限分别办理。

第九条 市政府办公室办理市人民政府常务会议纪要、市长办公会议纪要，应在会议结束后7个工作日内整理、送签、印发。

第十条 各级政府对于本级政府部门和下级政府的请示，应当在收到请示之日起10个工作日内批复或答复。

第十一条 上级政府部门对其主管或指导的下级政府部门的请示，应当从收到请示之日起10个工作日内批复或答复。

第十二条 行政机关之间的函件等，能够当场办理的应予当场办理；不能当场办理的应当在收到函件之日起10个工作日内书面答复。

第十三条 各级政府部门代政府草拟的规范性文件，需要其他部门会签的，会签部门能够当场办理的应予当场办理；不能当场办理的应当从收到文稿之日起3个工作日内会签。

经过相关部门会签后，送政府法制部门审查，材料齐全的，政府法制部门应当从收到文稿及其他材料之日起7个工作日内予以审查；材料不全的，应当从收到文稿之日起3个工作日内一次性告知起草部门需要补正的全部材料。情况复杂，需要与相关部门会商的，可适当延期。

第十四条 经相关部门会签并经政府法制部门审查后的规范性文件文稿，政府办公室应当在10个工作日内送签、印发。

第十五条 行政机关制定的规范性文件，报送政府法制部门统一登记、统一编号、统一公布，材料齐全的，政府法制部门应当在7个工作日内发出《规范性文件登记通知书》，并予以公布；材料不全的，应当从收到文稿之日起3个工作日内一次性告知起草部门需要补正的全部材料。

第十六条　因情况复杂或需要进行勘验、咨询、论证、评估、调查而不能按期办结、需要延期的事项，承办机关应当填写《机关办理事项延期申请表》，由分管或者主要负责人批准，可以延长15个工作日。同时，承办机关应当在期限届满前书面告知申办的行政机关，并说明原因和理由。

第十七条 办理的事项需要补正材料以及依法需要经过听证、招标、拍卖、检验、检测、勘测、检疫、鉴定、专家评审或需请示上级批复的，所需时间不计算在办理期限之内。承办机关应当将上述程序所需时间在《机关办理事项收件回执》中填写清楚，告知申办的行政机关。

第十八条 承办机关无正当理由在本规范规定的期限内未能办结的，属超时办理。

有下列情形之一的，视为超时办理：

（一）无正当理由对行政机关的请示、报告、函件不予受理的；

（二）不按规定给予答复的；

（三）超过办结时限才提出延期申请的；

（四）在规定的期限内，不将办理结果及时交付给申办机关的。

　　第十九条 行政机关无正当理由未能在规定的期限内批复或者答复请示、函告事项的，应当视为默许或同意，由此而造成的不良后果，由超时办理的行政机关承担相应责任。

第二十条 违反本规范超时办理的，由市政府给予通报批评；情节严重、造成严重后果的，依法依规追究直接责任人、直接主管负责人有关责任。

第二十一条 本规范由市人民政府法制办公室负责解释。

第二十二条 本规范自2009年1月1日起施行。


Chapter IV
Function of Panels: Art. 11 of the DSU


OUTLINE


I Introduction
II Application of Art. 11 as a General Standard of Review
III Review in “neither de novo nor total defence”
IV Allegation against Panels’ Standard of Review
V Exercise of Judicial Economy





I Introduction
The function of panels is expressly defined in Art. 11 of the DSU, which reads as follows:

“The function of panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities under this Understanding and the covered agreements. Accordingly, a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements. Panels should consult regularly with the parties to the dispute and give them adequate opportunity to develop a mutually satisfactory solution.”

This provision suggests that the function of panels is to make an objective assessment such as to assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements. However, how do panels fulfill their functions as provided in Art. 11 of the DSU? It is the issue that we will touch on in this chapter. In this chapter, the author explores on the standard of review issue under the WTO, i.e. “an objective assessment”; as well as on the exercised judicial economy principle developed in panel’s review.
With regard to the standard of review issue, the GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedures have increasingly confronted questions concerning the degree to which an international body, under the GATT/WTO, should “second guess” a decision of a national government agency concerning economic regulations that are allegedly inconsistent with an international rule. It seems clear that the international agreement doesn’t permit a national government’s determination always to prevail, otherwise the international rules could be easily evaded or rendered ineffective. But should the international body approach the issues involved without any deference to the national government? It has been argued in the GATT/WTO proceedings that panels should respect national government determinations, up to some point. That “point” is the crucial issue that has sometimes been labelled the “standard of review”.1
Of course, this issue is not unique to the GATT/WTO. Naturally, the standard-of-review issue is one that many legal systems face. “The standard-of-review question is faced at least implicitly whenever sovereign members of a treaty yield interpretive and dispute settlement powers to international panels and tribunals. Moreover, as national economies become increasingly interdependent, and as the need for international cooperation and coordination accordingly becomes greater, the standard-of-review question will become increasingly important.” 2 And “it can be seen that the standard-of-review question is a recurring and delicate one, and one that to some extent goes to the core of an international procedure that must (in a rule-based system) assess a national government’s actions against treaty or other international norms”. 3
However, for the immediate purpose, we want to focus below on the more particular question of the proper standard of review for a WTO panel when it undertakes to examine a national government’s actions or rulings that engage the question of consistency with the various WTO agreements and are subject to the DSU procedures.

II Application of Art. 11 as a General Standard of Review
Under the WTO jurisprudence, it’s demonstrated that Art. 11 of the DSU has been applied as a general standard of review. Art. 11 suggests that the function of panels is to make “an objective assessment” so as to assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements.
For example, in US-Shirts and Blouses (DS33), the Panel rules that, “although the DSU does not contain any specific reference to standards of review, we consider that Article 11 of the DSU which describes the parameters of the function of panels, is relevant here”. 4
And the application of Art. 11 as a general standard of review under the DSU is analyzed systematically in EC-Hormones (DS26/DS48) where the Appellate Body rules that: 5
“The first point that must be made in this connection, is that the SPS Agreement itself is silent on the matter of an appropriate standard of review for panels deciding upon SPS measures of a Member. Nor are there provisions in the DSU or any of the covered agreements (other than the Anti-Dumping Agreement) prescribing a particular standard of review. Only Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement has language on the standard of review to be employed by panels engaged in the ‘assessment of the facts of the matter’. We find no indication in the SPS Agreement of an intent on the part of the Members to adopt or incorporate into that Agreement the standard set out in Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Textually, Article 17.6(i) is specific to the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
[…]
We do not mean, however, to suggest that there is at present no standard of review applicable to the determination and assessment of the facts in proceedings under the SPS Agreement or under other covered agreements. In our view, Article 11 of the DSU bears directly on this matter and, in effect, articulates with great succinctness but with sufficient clarity the appropriate standard of review for panels in respect of both the ascertainment of facts and the legal characterization of such facts under the relevant agreements […]”
In sum, for all but one of the covered agreements, Art. 11 of the DSU sets forth the appropriate standard of review for panels. As stated on more than one occasion, Art. 11 of the DSU, and, in particular, its requirement that “a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”, sets forth the appropriate standard of review for panels examining the consistency or inconsistency of alleged measures under the WTO jurisprudence. And the only exception is the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, in which a specific provision, Art. 17.6, sets out a special standard of review for disputes arising under that Agreement（to be discussed in subsequent chapter）.6

III Review in “neither de novo nor total defence”
In EC-Hormones (DS26/DS48), in the view of the European Communities, “the principal alternative approaches to the problem of formulating the ‘proper standard of review’ so far as panels are concerned are two-fold. The first is designated as ‘de novo review’. This standard of review would allow a panel complete freedom to come to a different view than the competent authority of the Member whose act or determination is being reviewed. A panel would have to ‘verify whether the determination by the national authority was…correct (both factually and procedurally)’. The second is described as ‘deference’. Under a ‘deference’ standard, a panel, in the submission of the European Communities, should not seek to redo the investigation conducted by the national authority but instead examine whether the ‘procedure’ required by the relevant WTO rules had been followed”.7 In this respect, the Appellate Body rules that:8
“So far as fact-finding by panels is concerned, their activities are always constrained by the mandate of Article 11 of the DSU: the applicable standard is neither de novo review as such, nor ‘total deference’, but rather the ‘objective assessment of the facts’. Many panels have in the past refused to undertake de novo review, wisely, since under current practice and systems, they are in any case poorly suited to engage in such a review. On the other hand, ‘total deference to the findings of the national authorities’, it has been well said, ‘could not ensure an 'objective assessment' as foreseen by Article 11 of the DSU’.”
The ruling is confirmed on many other occasions. For example, the Panel on US-Underwear (DS24) finds that: 9
“In our opinion, a policy of total deference to the findings of the national authorities could not ensure an ‘objective assessment’ as foreseen by Article 11 of the DSU. This conclusion is supported, in our view, by previous panel reports that have dealt with this issue, and most notably in the panel report on the ‘Transformers’ case.
The panel in the ‘Transformers’ case was confronted with the argument of New Zealand that the determination of ‘material injury’ by the competent New Zealand investigating authority could not be scrutinized by the panel. The ‘Transformers’ panel responded to this argument as follows:
‘The Panel agreed that the responsibility to make a determination of material injury caused by dumped imports rested in the first place with the authorities of the importing contracting party concerned. However, the Panel could not share the view that such a determination could not be scrutinized if it were challenged by another contracting party. On the contrary, the Panel believed that if a contracting party affected by the determination could make a case that the importation could not in itself have the effect of causing material injury to the industry in question, that contracting party was entitled, under the relevant GATT provisions and in particular Article XXIII, that its representations be given sympathetic consideration and that eventually, if no satisfactory adjustment was effected, it might refer the matter to the CONTRACTING PARTIES, as had been done by Finland in the present case. To conclude otherwise would give governments complete freedom and unrestricted discretion in deciding anti-dumping cases without any possibility to review the action taken in the GATT. This would lead to an unacceptable situation under the aspect of law and order in international trade relations as governed by the GATT’.”
In short, for the panel to adopt a policy of total deference to the findings of the national authorities could not ensure an “objective assessment” as foreseen by Art. 11 of the DSU. This conclusion is supported, in our view, by previous panel reports that have dealt with this issue. However, panels do not see their review as a substitute for the proceedings conducted by national investigating authorities, either. For example, in Argentina-Footwear (DS121), the Panel doesn’t consider that they have the mandate to conduct a de novo review: 10
“This approach is consistent with the reports of panels reviewing national investigations… The panel on United States - Anti-dumping Duties on Import of Salmon from Norway concluded that it should not engage in a de novo review of the evidence examined by the national investigating authority.
The panel on United States - Underwear followed this approach by noting, however, that it did not see its ‘review as a substitute for the proceedings conducted by national investigating authorities or by the Textiles Monitoring Body (TMB). Rather…the Panel's function should be to assess objectively the review conducted by the national investigating authority, in this case the CITA. We draw particular attention to the fact that a series of panel reports in the anti-dumping and subsidies/countervailing duties context have made it clear that it is not the role of panels to engage in a de novo review. In our view, the same is true for panels operating in the context of the ATC, since they would be called upon, as in the cases dealing with anti-dumping and/or subsidies/countervailing duties, to review the consistency of a determination by a national investigating authority imposing a restriction under the relevant provisions of the relevant WTO legal instruments, in this case the ATC. …’
Accordingly, the panel on United States - Underwear decided, ‘in accordance with Article 11 of the DSU, to make an objective assessment of the Statement issued by the US authorities … which, as the parties to the dispute agreed, constitutes the scope of the matter properly before the Panel without, however, engaging in a de novo review. … an objective assessment would entail an examination of whether the CITA had examined all relevant facts before it, whether adequate explanation had been provided of how the facts as a whole supported the determination made, and, consequently, whether the determination made was consistent with the international obligations of the United States’.
The panel on United States - Shirts and Blouses also stated that ‘[t]his is not to say that the Panel interprets the ATC as imposing on the importing Member any specific method either for collecting data or for considering and weighing all the relevant economic factors upon which the importing Member will decide whether there is need for a safeguard restraint. The relative importance of particular factors including those listed in Article 6.3 of the ATC is for each Member to assess in the light of the circumstances of each case’.
These past GATT and WTO panel reports make it clear that panels examining national investigations in the context of the application of anti-dumping and countervailing duties, as well as safeguards under the ATC, have refrained from engaging in a de novo review of the evidence examined by the national authority.”
However, as emphasized by the Appellate Body, although panels are not entitled to conduct a de novo review of the evidence, nor to substitute their own conclusions for those of the competent authorities, this does not mean that panels must simply accept the conclusions of the competent authorities. In this respect, the phrase “de novo review” should not be used loosely. If a panel concludes that the competent authorities, in a particular case, have not provided a reasoned or adequate explanation for their determination, that panel has not, thereby, engaged in a de novo review. Nor has that panel substituted its own conclusions for those of the competent authorities. Rather, the panel has, consistent with its obligations under the DSU, simply reached a conclusion that the determination made by the competent authorities is inconsistent with the specific requirements of the covered Agreement. 11