The SOE reform in China/周大勇

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The SOE reform in China
Zhou Dayong
Summer semester 2003
Europa-University Viadrina,Germany

Abstract:
The essay tries to study the process of the state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform in China. Chinese economic reform resulted in significant influences on all social aspects, SOEs as an especially economic sector suffers a change both in internal management as well in the outside economic environment. I try to discuss in the essay, that the Chinese SOE reform has made large progress, however, SOE can’t conquer many problems by itself, the resolution of SOE lies in elimination of SOE by a further reform including property transition and construction of a fairer market.


Outline
1. History of the SOE reform in China
2. The main problems left in the reform
3. The reasons of SOE problem behind
4. Argue of some reform plans and suggestion
5. Conclusion


1. The history of the SOEs reform in China
1.1 the establishment of SOE
In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came into power in Mainland China. One goal of the CCP was to lead China into a modern socialism society. In economic scale, it meant mainly industrialization. According to CCP’s policy, the form of industrial organization must be based upon state owned enterprises. The state-owned industrial system was set up by two ways. One was the new enterprise after the liberation. At the end WWII, most industrial sectors in China, such as communication network, transportation and power industry were destroyed and had to be rebuilt, at the same time, military industries and financial sector e.g. banking system was directly nationalized from the former control of Gongmin Party. Another way was transformation from the private ownership to state-owned enterprises. The private properties were regulated under state management, in some cases, for instance in commercial scale, the former private enterprises were bought by local government gradually. Till 1952, about 83% of industrial companies were controlled by the state; a socialism economic system was announced established. (Fig 1)
1.2 The reform began from 1978
Until Chinese economic reform began in 1978, public ownership in forms of state-owned and collectivized were only legal ownership of property. In industrial sector, the enterprises were controlled respectively under central or local governments, the latter made decisions for the enterprises, the enterprises were not profit seeking economic entities, they were simply workshops to execute centrally set policies.
In 1970s, the discontent of economic situation accumulated constantly, because the defects of central planning system became obviously more and more. Around 1978, the rural reform took place from grass roots and spread quickly, till 1982, the collectivized people commune had to be abolished. In company with the reform, the free market in a certain degree was developed. At the same time, the problem of lack of autonomy in SOE, which led to low efficiency, was also taken into account. Therefore, from 1978 on, the Communist Party, under the leading of Deng Xiaoping, put hand to solve the SOE problem. From 1978 to 1984, the efforts of the reform concentrated on giving the SOEs more autonomy by allowing them increased authority over the allocation of their profits, and limited production autonomy. The rest profits could be used either to finance increased investments or to pay bonuses to employees. Besides, administrative control over SOEs was decentralized to local governments. But as the prices were still centrally determined and SOEs did not realize the cost of their fixed and working capital, the reforms did not improve much the resource allocation or the utilization of capital. (1)

1.3 Contract is the main form in the second phase.
From 1985 to 1992 was the second phase of the SOE reform. The policy named Zhenqi Fenkai (separating government from enterprises), the central government decided to turn SOEs into truly independent production and management entities, and stipulate that enterprises must take responsibilities for their own profits and losses by means of contracts and leasing. The common practice was: the enterprises sign a manage contract with the responsible authorities. Under the contract, enterprises were not only allowed to retain the extra profits after they had fulfilled the contracted quotas, but also allowed to arrange their own manage including dismiss or enroll personnel. By the end of 1987, about 80% of state-owned industrial enterprises adopted the contracts system. In 1991, over 90% of the previously contracted enterprises signed the second round of contracts. Meanwhile, based on the first round contract practice, the content of the contract was improved; the authority introduced more rational norms to examine the fulfillment of contract. A multiple index system was formed, which included economic efficiency index, development potentiality index and management index etc.
During this period, the practice of shareholding reform appeared as well. This new creature was adopted at first by village enterprises, which come from the former collective enterprises. The village enterprises were always short of capital, so they raised money from the village residents. Along with the reform moved forward from countryside to cities, the shareholding system was also introduced into SOE reform. Early in April 1984 Chinese reform committee organized a seminar to discuss the exploitation of shareholding in SOE reform. That conference drew a conclusion that shareholding system is a rational way to restructure the collective and state owned enterprises in cities. In July the same year, the first shareholding company after Chinese liberation—Beijing Tianqiao department store (shareholding) came onto horizon. Till 1991, there were already 709 state owned enterprises restructured along shareholding system. These enterprises included industrial sector companies, trade companies, also financial enterprises, construction enterprises etc.
Besides, in the second phase of SOE reform, tax system had also a great change. Instead of handing in profit, SOEs paid a certain portion of tax according to their revenue level. The State and local government collected tax separately; this measure was implemented to loose the relation between SOE and local authority.
However, during this period, the SOEs showed their weakness in competition with the new developed private companies, joint venture companies and township and village enterprises, because at one side, the manager of SOEs didn’t get use to do business in a free market, the attitude of waiting, relying on government and begging for help were widespread. At another side, the relationship between government and enterprises became more complicated, because, although under the contract system, the government have no right to interfere in the SOEs management, they still rely on each other: the government need the SOE to have good performance in order to settle surplus labor forces and continue to play a role in maintain the social stability, at the same time, to increase the government’s revenue to deal with the raising infrastructure investment and other expense. The SOE, on the other side, need the protection of the authority, in order to obtain more chance to get loans, subsidizes or orders in government arranged projects. Besides, even though most of direct subsidies form the state have been cancelled, many domestic savings were also channeled into SOEs, because banks had been directed to take up the role of making "loans" to SOEs instead of the state. The total of non-performing loans has grown so large that it started to endanger the banking system. (2)

1.4 The MES is the key point in the third phase of the reform and the achievements
Form 1993 on, the reform moved into the third phase, the aim called setting up the modern enterprises system (MES). The Third Plenary Session of the 14th Party Central Committee in November 1993 proposed: "It is the inevitable request for market economy to set up modern enterprise system, it is a direction of the SOE reform of China. "This indicates that SOE reform enters a new stage of system innovation. In 1994 the State Council determined to chose 100 state-run large and medium-sized enterprises to launch an experiment to implement restructure along MES. The basic demands of the experiment were to "define right and responsibility clearly, separate government function from enterprise management, and operate scientifically”. Those requirements were in fact the basic characters concerning modern enterprises system. Along the policy of building MES system, and based upon the development of the whole economy, there were many achievements reached in the third phase.
1) By 2000, most large and middle scale SOEs have set up modern enterprise system tentatively. According to the investigation in 2473 enterprises of State Statistics Bureau 2000, 2016 enterprises have restructured, account 81.5%. Among those enterprises, 603 turned to Co., Ltd., accounts for 29.9%; 713 were restructured to limited companies, accounts for 35.4%; the number of solely state-owned company is 700, accounts for 34.7%. As for their management, 82.2% established shareholders’ meeting, 95.1% established the board of directors, and the board of supervisors has been established in 84.5% of enterprises. Therefore, corporate governance structure has already taken shape in SOEs.
2) In this phase, during" the Ninth Five-Year Plan", China began to adjust the state-run economic layout strategically, The idea called Zhuada Fangxiao (to grab the big ones and let the small ones go). The reform for medium and large SOEs focused on fostering a batch of trans-regional, inter-trade, inter-ownership big SOE groups through reorganizing, transforming, uniting annex. In 1997, the number of national large-scale enterprise groups expands to 120. For instance, under approval by the State Council, China Petrochemical Corporation, China Oil and Natural Gas Corporation were predominated to two large groups, whose assets of enterprise group reached in 40 billion dollars, such measure improved the intensification degree and international competitiveness of Chinese petrochemical industry greatly. Another example was in telecommunication market, six major SOE telecom groups (China Telecom, China Mobile, China Unicom, China satellite communication, China railway communication) were predominated. So a new form of competition in field of communication service took shape.
By the end of 2001, national key enterprises add up to 2710, total assets up to 1,280,450 million dollar. Among 179 super-huge enterprise groups, whose business income is over 500 million dollar, there are 165 state-owned or state-holding enterprise groups.
3) During this phase, separating government function from enterprise management was strengthened harder than before. Chinese government started administrative organization structure reform in 1998. Through this administrative restructure, the departments of the State Council reduced from 40 to 29. At provincial level, government departments reduced from 55 on average to 40, about 20% departments were simply. Some departments were cancelled totally. The cancellation of government departments indicated that the SOE stay in the charge of specialized official department manages changed completely. Meanwhile, the administration rank of the state-owned enterprise were cancelled, some administrative approval procedure were simplified.
4) To relieve the social burden of SOEs, re-employment service center were set up to shunt the redundant staff of enterprises. It has been a great difficult problem of the SOE reform from begin on that enterprises are overstaffed. It is an important measure of revitalizing the SOEs to dismiss and distribute workers. In June 1998, the state council required all regions to set up re-employment service center system. National Ministry of Labor and Social Security emphasized that the laid-off worker in SOEs must 100% enter the re-employment service center. The re-employment service center determined to provide serve functions such as grant basic living cost, withhold social insurance, organize job training and launch employment etc. for laid-off worker. The fund, which used for ensuring laid-off worker's basic life and paying the social insurance premium, come from financial budget, enterprise as well as societies (namely form contribution or from laid-off worker themselves), each part bears 1/3 of the whole fund. The re-employment service center provides service for laid-off workers for at longest 3 years. When they can’t reemploy after this period, can still enjoy unemployment compensation or the society relieve according to relevant regulation.
In this reform stage, re-employment service center played a positive role on maintain social stability. From 1998 to the end of 2001, 25,500,000 laid-off workers emerged (Fig 3) in national state-owned enterprises, among them more than 17 million people were reemployed, more than 3 million people retired. However, re-employment service center was only a transitional institute, because the SOE had to still take responsibility to settle down those laid off workers. According to a new policy, all laid-off workers after 2001 are treat as unemployed and have to enter free labor force market.
5) In order to extricate SOE from predicament, especially to resolve the problem of high liability-asset ratio, by December 2000, 580 SOEs began to implement debt-to-share swap, that mean the enterprises’ debt were recalculated as share (enterprises’ equity), so that the interest burden of SOEs were lightened. In the process, most of unperformed loans would be calculated as shares, which would be gathered and supervised by a new state commission-- State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). Till 2001, the total amount of money of debt-to-equity swap account 40,5 billion dollars, and the result was that the average asset-liability ratio of debt-to-share swapped enterprises dropped from more than 70% to under 50%.

2. The main problems left in the reform
After three steps reform, the SOE acquired more autonomy, as we have seen, the whole economic circumstance were also better. But because the reform did not touch the socialism idea from begin on, thus the transition of ownership of SOE was left basically unchanged, the defects of SOE could not changed completely. In the context of China’s economic reforms, there are still a few problems in SOE sector existed and have also a deep influence.
First of all, the interventions from the government still maintained influence in SOE. The administrative relation between enterprise and government is still remaining. Even the Local State Assets management office was established, it belong to the same bureaucratic system like former authorities. It can appoint or remove senior executives of SOEs. If enterprise applies to the broad structure, the directors in broad are appointed by it. The office has also a say in the transfer of holdings, corporate mergers, closures or other major changes to the enterprises, it is also charged with the tasks of clarifying property rights and settling disputes (3) . It seemed that the state assets supervisory takes the place of former authority above the SOEs. Moreover, the local government maintains still strong power in local enterprise, they rely on each other as we discussed above. So long as the enterprises are state-owned, whether they are big groups, stock companies or little entities, it is difficult to shaking off the directly or indirectly control from the government.
Secondly, because of the long tradition, enterprises are still taking responsibilities for their employees in pension, medical areas, therefore the so-called “soft budget constraint” cannot be given up completely. Although we have discussed that the Chinese government has managed to start re-employment plan, SOEs also take a part of the fund to support the plan. Correspondenly, government had to shoulder some failures resulted from the mismanagement of SOEs’ and avoid from their bankruptcy, in order to prevent the enterprise from bankrupcy and thus endanger the social stability.
Thirdly, the management of SOEs has low quality compare with other economic sectors. Though SOEs have produced an average 10% growth rate in the value of industrial output during the period 1978-98, this rate is considerably below the average of other sectors. The problem has two reasons. One of them is lacking of the inner incentive of the managers. The SOE managers are not entrepreneurs in the true sense, but bureaucrats at any rate. Their appointment by the government not basically according to their managerial capability, but based on their rankings in the bureaucratic hierarchy through the politic system. Another factor concerns the supervision within the SOE, it is also lacking in most cases. In practice, the position of supervisor in a enterprise is normally taken by staff within the enterprise and in most cases, the position of president of the supervision committee is taken by somebody within the enterprise, who is under the leadership of the directors and managers in his ranks both at work and in the Party. This system makes it very hard for the supervision committee to fully perform its authority (4) .
Fourth, the high liability-asset ratio is also regarded as a fatal problem of SOEs. It was observed, that during the reform period, the liability-asset ratio of industrial SOEs rose from around 11% in 1978 to approximately 65% in 1997. In as many as one-fourth of industrial SOEs, liabilities have even come to exceed assets; these enterprises are in fact insolvent. The World Bank suggests that in debt restructuring may be necessary for the most heavily indebted enterprises to bankrupt. After the implement of debt-to-share swap, the ratio decreased, but the debtor, in most cases are banks, didn’t collect the loan back, so it made the SOE even harder to get new loan for production. (5)
Furthermore, the whole process of the SOE reform companied by a serials of social problems, in compare to some difficulties such as lack or reserve labor force, ageing of the equipments, the most troublesome is the unemployment in large scales. In addition, in rural areas, millions of flowing population has been produced because of the bankruptcy and low profitability of the township and village enterprise. In urban China there are frequent reports about workers’ unrest. Although until now China still maintain a relative political stability, the menace will not fade away in a short time.

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最高人民法院关于依法严厉打击集资诈骗和非法吸收公众存款犯罪活动的通知

最高人民法院


最高人民法院关于依法严厉打击集资诈骗和非法吸收公众存款犯罪活动的通知


(2004年年11月15日最高人民法院文件法[2004]240号公布 自公布之日起施行)

各省、自治区、直辖市高级人民法院,解放军军事法院,新疆维吾尔自治区高级人民法院生产建设兵团分院:

  近年来,一些地方集资诈骗、非法吸收公众存款犯罪活动十分猖獗,大案要案接连发生,严重扰乱金融市场秩序,侵犯公民、法人和其他组织的合法权益。为了切实维护国家金融市场秩序和社会政治稳定,现就人民法院充分发挥审判职能作用,依法严厉打击集资诈骗和非法吸收公众存款犯罪活动的有关问题通知如下:

一、充分认识集资诈骗和非法吸收公众存款犯罪的严重社会危害性,切实加强对这类犯罪案件的审判工作。当前,各种形式的非法集资犯罪活动,手段更加狡黠,欺骗性更强,导致大量人民群众上当受骗。不少集资诈骗和非法吸收公众存款犯罪案件,涉案金额特别巨大,受害人员范围广,给公民和法人以及其他组织造成巨额财产损失,严重破坏金融市场秩序,由此导致的群体性事件屡有发生,严重影响社会政治稳定。各级人民法院一定要从贯彻“三个代表”重要思想,树立和落实科学发展观,落实“司法为民”要求的高度,进一步提高对集资诈骗和非法吸收公众存款犯罪案件审判工作重要性的认识,全面发挥人民法院刑事审判职能作用,为有效遏制集资诈骗和非法吸收公众存款犯罪活动,规范金融市场秩序提供有力司法保障。

二、坚决贯彻依法严惩集资诈骗和非法吸收公众存款犯罪的方针,加大对集资诈骗和非法吸收公众存款犯罪的打击力度。金融犯罪一直是我国整顿和规范市场经济秩序工作的打击重点,集资诈骗和非法吸收公众存款犯罪案件,是金融犯罪刑事审判工作的重中之重。集资诈骗和非法吸收公众存款犯罪发案较多的地区,人民法院要积极配合有关部门,开展严厉打击这类犯罪的专项行动,切实维护金融市场秩序和社会政治稳定。对集资诈骗和非法吸收公众存款的犯罪活动,一定要贯彻依法严惩的方针,保持对犯罪的高压态势,以有效震慑不法分子,保护人民群众利益。一旦案件起诉后,即应尽快开庭,及时审结。对集资诈骗数额特别巨大并且给国家和人民利益造成特别重大损失,罪行极其严重的犯罪分子,依法应该判处死刑的,要坚决判处死刑,决不手软。在对犯罪分子判处主刑的同时,要依法适用财产刑,并加大赃款赃物的追缴力度,不让犯罪分子在经济上获取非法利益。对集资诈骗和非法吸收公众存款共同犯罪案件中的主犯,一定要依法从严惩处。

三、坚持审判工作法律效果和社会效果有机统一,积极参与金融市场经济秩序的综合治理。各级人民法院在审判集资诈骗和非法吸收公众存款犯罪案件工作中,要把依法审判与法制宣传有机结合起来。注意通过依法公开宣判、新闻媒体宣传等各种行之有效的形式,揭露犯罪骗局,教育广大群众,提高公民防骗意识。要妥善处理涉及众多被害人的犯罪案件,注意追缴犯罪分子的违法所得,及时将被骗的集资款返还被害人,配合地方党委和政府做好案件的善后工作,尽量将犯罪造成的不良后果降到最低限度,确保社会稳定。对办案过程中发现有关部门和单位在资金管理制度和环节上存在的漏洞和隐患,要及时提出司法建议,以做到防患于未然。

四、深入调查研究,及时解决审判这类案件中的疑难问题。各高级人民法院对于近期受理的集资诈骗和非法吸收公众存款大要案的审理情况,要及时报告我院。审理集资诈骗和非法吸收公众存款犯罪案件政策性强,涉及法律适用问题疑难,各高级人民法院对在审判工作中遇到的新情况、新问题,要认真研究,提出意见,加强指导,及时报告我院。



深圳市建设局关于印发《深圳市管道燃气居民用户用气安全检查办法》的通知

广东省深圳市建设局


深圳市建设局关于印发《深圳市管道燃气居民用户用气安全检查办法》的通知

深建规〔2008〕2号

各有关单位:

  为保障公共安全和居民用户用气安全,规范管道燃气企业安全检查行为,根据《深圳市燃气条例》第四十八条规定,结合我市实际,我局制定了《深圳市管道燃气居民用户用气安全检查办法》。现予以印发,请遵照执行。

深圳市建设局
二〇〇八年八月二十五日

深圳市管道燃气居民用户用气安全检查办法

  第一条 为保障公共安全和居民用户用气安全,规范管道燃气企业安全检查行为,根据《深圳市燃气条例》第四十八条规定,制定本办法。

  第二条 本办法适用于管道燃气企业对居民用户户内的燃气设施及用气情况进行的安全检查。

  本办法所称管道燃气设施,是指用于居民用户户内供气的燃气管道、入户球阀、燃气调压器、燃气流量表和旋塞阀。

  本办法所称用气情况,是指居民用户户内管道燃气设施使用情况是否符合规范要求。

  第三条 管道燃气企业应当对居民用户户内管道燃气设施和安全用气情况每12个月至少检查一次,并做好记录;发现安全隐患的,应当及时书面告知居民用户整改。

  居民用户及物业管理单位应当对管道燃气企业实施的安全检查活动予以配合。居民用户应当允许安全检查人员入户实施用气安全检查。

  第四条 管道燃气企业应当制定年度安全检查计划。实施安全检查前应当提前在居民用户楼房的显著位置张贴安全检查通知,告知居民用户安全检查的相关事项。

  第五条 安全检查采用外观判断和燃气泄漏检测仪或者检漏液(皂液)检测的方法进行。

  安全检查人员实施入户用气安全检查时,应当着工作服,佩戴并出示有效证件。

  第六条 因无法进入居民用户家中未能实施安全检查的,管道燃气企业应当采取在居民用户楼房显著位置张贴通告或者气费通知单注明等方式告知该居民用户,由该居民用户向管道燃气企业预约上门实施安全检查。安全检查人员应当做好记录、注明相关情况。

  第七条 安全检查人员实施安全检查时,应当对如下情形进行检查:

  (一)燃气管道是否暗埋、改装或者拆除;

  (二)燃气管道是否严重锈蚀;

  (三)燃气管道末端是否封堵;

  (四)燃气钢瓶是否连接到燃气管道上;

  (五)燃气管道系统是否漏气;

  (六)是否使用非专用燃气阀门、旋塞;

  (七)使用软管是否合格;

  (八)燃具安装是否符合要求;

  (九)燃具是否漏气;

  (十)是否自行增加了用气设施;

  (十一)用气场所是否通风顺畅。

  第八条 安全检查中发现存在本办法第七条所列情形的,管道燃气企业应当在安全检查现场向居民用户签发隐患告知书;安全检查中发现存在本办法第七条第三项、第四项、第五项、第九项情形的,安全检查人员还应当立即关闭隐患点供气阀门并加贴封条,告知居民用户停止用气。

  居民用户应当对隐患告知书中注明的隐患进行整改,涉及燃气器具的隐患应当委托燃具生产厂家或者维修企业处理,涉及燃气设施的隐患应当委托有资质的企业处理。

  对安全检查中关闭的阀门,居民用户不得自行开启使用并立即对隐患进行整改。整改后申请管道燃气企业予以确认的,管道燃气企业应当自居民用户申请之日起3个工作日内予以确认并恢复供气。

  第九条 居民用户应当对管道燃气企业签发的隐患告知书予以签收,对入户安全检查记录予以确认。

  居民用户拒绝签收的,管道燃气企业应当在隐患告知书和入户安全检查记录上注明情况,并应当采取将隐患告知书留置现场和气费通知单注明等方式送达用户。

  第十条 管道燃气企业应当在安全检查结束后1个月内,将安全检查情况进行汇总归档。

  第十一条 本办法自公布之日起施行,有效期5年。